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I. INTRODUCTION
If public interest litigation is intended to empower victims, the inter-
vention of lawyers may be counterproductive. As numerous legal
scholars have noted, the dynamics of the lawyer-client dyad may foster a
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Berman, Robert Blitt, Stacy Caplow, Sandy Coliver, Heidi Kitrosser, Beth van Schaack, and
David Weissbrodt for their helpful suggestions and encouragement during the writing process;
to Alpha Fall, Julia Harrington, Viviana Krsticevic, and Richard Wilson for their willingness to
share the lessons of their experience litigating in the African and Inter-American Commis-
sions; to William Aceves, Minna Kotkin, Elliott Milstein, Cynthia Morel, Ann Shalleck, and
Dinah Shelton for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article; and to Jason
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and meticulous editing), Alison Stites, and Lilian Tsai for their invaluable research assistance.
I am also deeply grateful to Victor Katz for his endless fascination with my work and his un-
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pattern of dependence which replicates the type of subjugation that
drove the client to seek legal assistance in the first place.' The client,
seduced by the prospect of alliance with a perceived player in the pre-
vailing power structure, cedes decision-making authority to her lawyer
all too readily. The lawyer, consumed with the pursuit of a social change
agenda, dispenses with time-consuming client consultations in order to
focus more single-mindedly on the cause. In the process, the client's in-
dividual needs are sacrificed to the pursuit of JUSTICE writ large.
As Stephen Ellmann notes, most public interest litigation in U.S.
courts is intended to empower a victim population which extends beyond
those individuals whose interests are specifically addressed in the court-
room. 2 The public interest lawyer thus works "either explicitly or
implicitly" on behalf of groups.3 In cases of explicit group representa-
tion, a lawyer's fiduciary obligations extend to the client entity rather
than its individual members, whose views are normally represented by a
designated intermediary.4 Group members have even less autonomy in
class action litigation, where a lawyer may, with judicial approval, settle
a case despite the opposition of a majority of designated class represen-
tatives.' Although the choice to structure litigation on behalf of a group
technically rests with the client, the lawyer may, either consciously or
1. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 51-52 (1992) ("When a client asks a lawyer to intervene in his life,
he seeks help at the risk of further subordination.. "'); see also Richard D. Marsico, Working
for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is There A Role for "Facilitative"
Lawyering?, I CLINICAL L. REV. 639, 639 (1995) (noting that "the risks to client autonomy
inherent in any attorney-client relationship are exacerbated in social change lawyering, as the
client's social subordination may simply replicate itself in the attomey-client relationship");
Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 861, 861 (1990) ("Because advocacy is a practice of speaking for-of presuming and
thereby prescribing the silence of the other-the advocate ... inevitably replays the drama of
subordination in her own work."); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal
Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 108 (1977) ("The definition of the client's prob-
lems and the 'best' available solutions are not mutually explored and elaborated; they are
imposed by the lawyer's view of the situation and what is possible within it.").
2. Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Col-
lective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV.
1103, 1106 (1992).
3. Id.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (declaring that "[a] lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980) ("A law-
yer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity
and not to... [any individual] person connected with the entity.").
5. Ellmann, supra note 2, at 1118-19. As Ellmann recognizes, class action litigation
may be the only option to secure class members' legal rights, which they can then use to en-
hance their autonomy. See id. at 1108 n.19.
1098 [Vol. 26:1097
From Dyad to Triad
unconsciously, influence this decision in the course of the counseling
6
process.
The tension between client autonomy and the advancement of a so-
cial change agenda is exacerbated in the context of public interest
litigation in the international arena, otherwise known as international
human rights litigation In many cases, international human rights law-
yers do not have regular contact with their clients, who live in other
countries. In situations where clients live in remote locations with mini-
mal communications infrastructure or where direct contact with foreign
lawyers could pose a security risk, contact may be primarily or exclu-
sively through intermediaries such as local lawyers or nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). In most cases, the proceedings occur outside the
victims' country of residence, which may limit their resonance with the
population whose rights are at issue. Cultural and linguistic differences
often compound these logistical barriers.
Moreover, the clients' priorities may be at odds with those of their
lawyers. Whereas victims and their families are often primarily inter-
ested in obtaining redress for the harm they have suffered,8 the focus of
international human rights lawyers tends to be more prospective than
retrospective. 9 If the victims are awarded damages, the difficulty of en-
forcing judgments rendered by most international fora minimizes the
prospect of obtaining such relief.) Thus, broader strategic goals such as
obtaining constructive judicial articulations of prevailing norms, holding
defendants accountable,1" generating greater public awareness of past
6. ld. at 1111-12.
7. For purposes of this Article, the term "international human rights litigation" refers
to any type of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings in a regional or international forum for the
purpose of protecting the rights of individuals or groups under international human rights law.
8. The types of redress sought may include information and reputational rehabilita-
tion, as well as monetary compensation. For example, families of disappeared victims have
frequently filed petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to determine
the location of their relatives' remains and obtain public statements that the victims were good
citizens. I am grateful to Dinah Shelton for drawing this point to my attention.
9. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
1269-71 (1991).
10. Notable exceptions include judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which are legally enforceable. See Organization
of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 68,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 53, 213 U.N.T.S.
222, amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, 155 E.T.S. I (entered into force Nov. 1,
1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int [hereinafter European Convention & Protocol 11,
respectively].
11. But see Stephen R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 464 (2001) (noting that promoting accountability for indi-
vidual violators of human rights "might provide victims of atrocities with a sense of justice
and a possibility to put the past behind them").
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abuses, and deterring future abuses are usually paramount in the minds
of international human rights lawyers." This hierarchy of priorities may
cause all but the most sophisticated clients to feel disengaged from the
litigation process unless they fully understand its purpose."
The potential for victim disempowerment is exacerbated by the lib-
eral standing requirements in the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Inter-American Commission) and the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), which permit third
parties to file petitions without the victims' authorization.1 4 Third-party
petitioning is necessary to ensure access to the Inter-American and Afri-
can Commissions for victims who are unable to communicate with these
fora directly due to a lack of sufficient financial or technical resources,
personal incapacity, or a fear of government retaliation." NGOs often
use this practice to file petitions on behalf of groups of victims who
would otherwise have been precluded from litigation due to incarcera-
tion, minority status, mental disabilities, security risks, disappearance, or
death. 16
12. These goals are not always mutually exclusive. Even unenforceable judgments have
been used to facilitate political settlements. Koh, supra note 9, at 2397-98.
13. Benedict Kingsbury, Representation in Human Rights Litigation, HUM. RTS. DIA-
LOGUE (Carnegie Council on Ethics and Int'l Aft., New York, N.Y.) Spring 2000, at 3,
available at http://www.cceia.org/media/608-hrd2-2.pdf (arguing that "lawyers and activists
must be more systematic and reflective in facing questions of representation and power" in
transnational human rights litigation and emphasizing the need for clearer ethical standards in
this context.).
14. The admissibility criteria of most other human rights fora preclude the filing of
petitions by parties who have not been personally injured by the alleged violations. See Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 1, 2, 999 U.T.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see
also Protocol 11, supra note 10, art. 34.
15. TARA MELISH, PROTECTING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: A MANUAL ON PRESENTING CLAIMS 75-76
(2002); EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 52-53 (1996).
16. See, e.g., S.O.S.-Esclaves v. Mauritania, Comm. No. 198/97, African Comm. Hum.
& Peoples' Rights (1999) (alleging that slavery remains common in Mauritania despite its
prohibition by law); Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda, Comm. Nos. 27/89,
46/91, 49/91, 99/93, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights (1996) (alleging forced expul-
sion of Burundian nationals, arbitrary arrests, as well as widespread massacres and
extrajudicial executions of Tutsis); Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Lib-
ertrs v. Chad, Comm. No. 74/92, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights (1995) (alleging,
among other things, killings, disappearances, and assassinations); 120 Cuban nationals and 8
Haitian nationals v. The Bahamas, Case 12.071, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 151, Report No. 6/02, doc.
5 rev. 1 (2002) (petition filed by the Center for Justice and International Law [hereinafter
CEJIL] and Open Society Institute alleging rights violations stemming from detention of
named asylum seekers); Adolescents in the Custody of the Febem v. Brazil, Case 12.328,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 181, Report No. 39/02, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002) (petition filed by CEJIL alleging
violations stemming from detention conditions); La Granja, Ituango v. Colombia, Case
12.050, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 198, Report No. 57/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/I. 111, doc. 20 rev. (2000)
1100 [Vol. 26:1097
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NGOs are often uniquely well-placed to represent the interests of
victims or their families. Local NGOs benefit from their geographic
proximity, as well as their familiarity with victims' languages, politics,
and cultures. 7 These assets permit communication with communities
affected by human rights abuses and facilitate the gathering of evi-
dence. Local NGOs often collaborate with international NGOs having
greater expertise in international law and broader regional experience. 9
Notwithstanding these advantages, an NGO's ability to repre-
sent particular victims may be complicated by a number of
(petition filed by Inter-Disciplinary Group for Human Rights and Colombian Commission of
Jurists alleging rights violations stemming from execution of named victims by paramilitary
groups operating with the acquiescence of state agents); Minors in Detention v. Honduras,
Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 575, Report No. 41/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. (1999)
(petition filed by CEJIL and Asociaci6n Casa Alianza alleging rights violations stemming
from unlawful arrest of named street children and their incarceration for prolonged periods
with adults). See also Petitioner's Second Supplemental Memorandum Submitted to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego &
Imperial Counties and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation v. United States of Amer-
ica, Case No. P65/1999, at 1-2 (May 8, 2001) (alleging that the United States government has
violated art. 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as the
principle of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine, by establishing "Operation Gate-
keeper," a Border Patrol operation along the California-Mexico border which has allegedly
caused the deaths of hundreds of migrants since 1994) (on file with author).
17. See Melissa Crow & Clement Nwankwo, Before "Things Fall Apart" in Nigeria:
The Role of Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations in Conflict Prevention, in VIGI-
LANCE AND VENGEANCE 171 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 1996) (asserting that these factors make
Nigerian human rights NGOs "in touch with the nation's heartbeat"); see also Martin A. Olz,
Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems, 28 COLUM. HuM. RTS.
L. REv. 307, 357 (1997) (noting that "[liocal human rights groups and institutions often re-
ceive information on human rights violations or are approached by victims or their families for
help in the form of legal assistance"). Presumably for this reason, the Inspection Panel of the
World Bank, an independent administrative body authorized to investigate complaints by
groups of people who claim to be adversely affected by the execution of a Bank project,
strongly prefers that requests be submitted by the affected individuals or their local representa-
tive. In exceptional cases where the requesting party alleges that no appropriate local
representative is available, a foreign representative may be permitted to submit a request,
subject to the approval of the Bank's Executive Directors. See The World Bank Inspection
Panel, I.B.R.D. Res. No. 93-10, I.D.A. Res. No. 93-6, 12 (Sept. 22, 1993), 34 I.L.M. 520
(1995).
18. See Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights
Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Lessons from the Euro-
pean and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 377, 393-94
(1999) (noting that international human rights tribunals have realized the need to tap into the
resourcefulness of human rights NGOs in gathering evidence); see also SCOTT DAVIDSON,
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 157 (1997) (noting that the Inter-American
Commission's standing requirements recognize the important role of NGOs in protecting
human rights).
19. Certain international NGOs' increasing recourse to different regional human rights
fora has begun to foster a useful cross-fertilization of jurisprudence. See Dinah Shelton, The
Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds., 1999).
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factors.20 These include conflicting priorities imposed by the
organization's funders,2' organizational mandate constraints dictated by
the Board of Directors, and differences of opinion among members of a
sizeable group.22 Moreover, local NGOs tend to be staffed by the coun-
try's educated elite, who may have difficulty cultivating trust among
victims with whom they have little in common." In the African Commis-
24sion, non-African NGOs often take the lead, creating additional
linguistic, cultural, racial, socioeconomic, logistical, and geographic bar-
riers to communication with victims. The adoption of a blatantly
political agenda further compromises the effectiveness of some NGOs.
The procedural rules of the Inter-American and African Commissions do
not account for these threats to NGO accountability."
The lack of any ethical guidelines for lawyers practicing in the inter-
national arena further complicates this scenario. In contrast to public
interest litigation in U.S. courts, where a lawyer's fiduciary obligations
20. Some of these factors may also interfere with the adequacy of a private lawyer's
representational efforts.
21. See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Why More Africans Don't Use Human Rights Lan-
guage, HUM. RTs. DIALOGUE (Carnegie Council on Ethics and Int'l Aff., New York, N.Y.)
Winter 2000, at 3, 4, available at http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmID/599 (asserting
that "[w]ith overseas donors as sources of reference and accountability, the only obligations
local human right groups have are reporting requirements arising under grant contracts where
these exist") (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
22. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 13 ("Where litigation involves a large and diverse
group, there is frequently confusion over the boundaries of the relevant community, who ex-
actly is a leader with a mandate to instruct the lawyers, whether dissenting views within the
community have been adequately aired, and who controls the presentation of the group's case
in national politics and the news media. These problems are magnified when ... there are
other intermediaries, such as NGOs... or confederations of indigenous organizations.").
23. See id. (noting that "[m]ost African human rights organizations are modeled after
Northern watchdog organizations, located in an urban area, run by a core management without
a membership base"); Peter Willetts, What is a Non-Governmental Organization?, City Uni-
versity, London, 2002, at http://www.staff.city.ac.uklp.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM
(noting that prominent NGOs may have leaders who are more engaged with global politics
than with the organization's members and supporters). But see Makau Mutua, Savages, Vic-
tims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 242 (2001)
(noting that "a more politically educated activist and thinker, one who questions the human
rights project more seriously and who seeks a culturally grounded program for social change,
has started to emerge" in Africa over the last decade).
24. See 01z, supra note 17, at 363.
25. See Hugo Slim, By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-
Governmental Organizations, The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Interna-
tional Meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights-Before and After September 11th,
Geneva, Switz., Jan. 10-12, 2002, 41 (defining "NGO accountability" as "the process by
which an NGO holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does and what it
does not do in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties and actively responding to
what it learns"); see also Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003) (defining "accountab[le]" to mean "an-
swerable to authority that can mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches
identified obligations").
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to an organizational client are comparatively well-defined 26 and an NGO
must demonstrate its entitlement to represent a group of victims before
filing a complaint on their behalf,27 the relationship among lawyers,
NGOs, and victim groups in the Inter-American and African Commis-
sions is much more amorphous. Upon receipt of a petition from an NGO,
neither the Inter-American nor the African Commission is obligated to
explore the nature of the relationship between the petitioning organiza-
tion and the alleged victims. Although some NGOs have a policy of
asking victims to sign a power of representation agreement, 28 neither fo-
rum requires victims to consent to NGO representation before a case is
filed or indeed even to know about it.29 Given these ambiguities, the ad-
judication of cases filed by NGOs in regional human rights commissions
may have limited resonance with victims and their communities.
In Part II, I analyze the standing requirements for NGO petitions to
the Inter-American and African Commissions and explore the ways in
which they may undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of each of
these fora, especially in the context of litigation on behalf of groups. In
Part III, I evaluate various proposals for addressing these problems based
on principles of class action and client-centered lawyering and conclude
that they are inadequate. I argue in Part IV that, for purposes of NGO
petitions to the Inter-American and African Commissions, the traditional
lawyer-client dyad should be recast as a lawyer-NGO-victim ° triad in
which petitioning NGOs and their lawyers have joint fiduciary obliga-
tions to victims, who are the critical stakeholders in the proceedings. At
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002). The Model Rules have
been adopted by most jurisdictions. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 (16th ed. 2005) (noting that "[f]orty-three states and
the District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules numbering system and most of the
language suggested by the Model Rules").
27. See infra notes 66-68.
28. These include CEJIL, an NGO based in Washington, DC which specializes in litiga-
tion before the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Telephone Interview with Viviana Krsticevic, Executive Director, CEJIL (October 7, 2005).
29. Consent of the parties is, however, required in the Inter-American Commission
prior to the initiation of friendly settlement negotiations and prior to the adoption of a friendly
settlement agreement. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AM. C.H.R. art. 41 (2000)
(amended Dec. 2003), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basicl6.htm [hereinafter
INTER-AM. C.H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE]. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also
requires advocates to obtain a power of representation from each of the alleged victims. Id. art.
23.
30. I use the term "victim" for purposes of identification only. As Sister Dianna Ortiz
has eloquently pointed out, "To call us victims is to validate the image our torturers tried to
mold us into and leave us-weak, subjugated, helpless. We are not victims. We are survivors."
Sister Dianna Ortiz, The Survivors'Perspective, in THE MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
TORTURE 15 (Ellen Gerrity et al. eds., 2001). See also Mutua, supra note 23, at 229 (asserting
that "[a] basic characteristic of the victim is powerlessness, an inability for self-defense
against the state or the culture in question").
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a minimum, these obligations should include obtaining free, prior, and
informed consent of victim groups before initiating litigation, keeping
victim groups apprised of developments as the litigation unfolds, and
incorporating victims' voices into the process.
In Part V, I analyze the viability of implementing the triad through
promulgation of a code of professional conduct for international human
rights lawyers, the development of norms on NGO accountability, and
amendment of the existing standing requirements in the Inter-American
and African Commissions. I conclude that, at least in the short term, the
last option would most effectively ensure that petitioning NGOs and
their lawyers, to whom I will refer jointly as "advocates" in instances
where their interests overlap, adequately represent victims in regional
human rights commissions.
II. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FORA AND THE
IMPENDING THREAT TO LEGITIMACY
The burgeoning number of international human rights institutions is
a testament to the international community's desire to breathe life into
treaty norms promulgated in the wake of World War II. These institu-
tions employ a broad spectrum of enforcement mechanisms ranging
from reporting requirements to adversarial proceedings. In cases where
the domestic judiciary has failed to provide redress for human rights
abuses, victims can file petitions against governments in Europe, the
Americas, and Africa with the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,31 and the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples' Rights," respectively. Through the
31. Petitions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter Inter-
American Commission] may be based on alleged violations by Organization of American
States member states of rights protected by the American Convention on Human Rights or the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See Statute of The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights arts. 19, 20, O.A.S. Res. 447, 9th Sess., OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4, rev.
8 (1979), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basicl5.htm (last visited July 18,
2005) (granting the Inter-American Commission jurisdiction to examine petitions against
states parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as communications re-
garding other member states of the Organization of American States, and to make appropriate
recommendations); see also Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 913,
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 117, doc. 5 rev. 1 30 (2002); Interpretation of the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, Adv. Op. OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.), No.
10 IT 35-45 (1989); Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
Res. No. 3/87, OEA/ser.L/V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 46-49 (1987).
32. The African Commission's protective functions include the consideration of com-
munications regarding alleged violations by African governments of the rights guaranteed by
the African Charter. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, arts. 46-
1104 [Vol. 26:1097
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conduct of their proceedings and the substance of their judgments, these
fora have tremendous potential to restore victims' dignity.33 The cathartic
effect of enabling victims to give voice to the human rights violations
they have suffered may itself facilitate the healing process.
3 4 The result-
ing judgments may provide further vindication by affirming that a
particular government's conduct violated prevailing international human
rights norms, ordering injunctive relief, and, in some cases, awarding
damages to individual victims.
Although the decisions of the Inter-American and African Commis-
sions are not legally enforceable,35 they can be used strategically to
generate far-reaching condemnation of rights-violating governments by
the international community. This process, known as "public shaming,"
59, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 253-54, 21 I.L.M. 58, 65 (1982) (entered into force October 21, 1986)
[hereinafter African Charter]; RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON Hu-
MAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, R. 88-120, Doc. ACHPR/RP/XIX (1996) (adopted Oct. 6, 1995),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 21
(Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2001) [hereinafter AFRICAN COMM'N RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE]. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights states that the Court "shall
.. complement the protective mandate of the African Conmmission...." However, it does not
delineate the precise relationship between the two institutions. Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights art. 2, OAU Doc. OUA/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.I.rev.2 (1998), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 82 (Rachel
Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2001) [hereinafter Protocol to the African Charter]. The estab-
lishment of the African Court has been delayed as a result of the African Union's decision that
it should be merged with the African Union Court of Justice. See Chaloka Beyani, A Human
Rights Court for Africa, 15 INTERIGHTS BULLETIN 1 (2004).
33. See Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights
Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 295, 301 (2005) (noting that "some
victims find comfort and a sense of empowerment in pursuing justice through law").
34. See Claudio Grossman, Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim
Representation in Human Rights Litigation, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 363, 383
(1992) ("For victims, being able to tell 'their truth' is valuable in itself. It also allows victims
to confront oppressors who may deny their very existence. Direct access empowers those who,
in the view of their oppressors, were supposed to be totally helpless."); see also Beth Van
Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279,
281 (2003) (highlighting the importance of providing victims with a meaningful litigation
experience and promoting human dignity in human rights class actions in U.S. courts).
35. If proceedings before the Inter-American Commission do not result in a friendly
settlement or if a target state fails to comply with the Commission's recommendations within
a prescribed period, the Commission generally refers the matter to the contentious jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is empowered to issue legally binding
judgments. See ACHR, supra note 10, arts. 61, 63, 68; see also INTER-AM. C.H.R. RULES OF
PROCEDURE, supra note 29, art. 44. In order for the Inter-American Court to have jurisdiction
over such a case, the relevant state party must have filed a declaration or special agreement
recognizing the Court's jurisdiction. Id. art. 62.
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is critical to promoting governments' compliance with their international
legal obligations.36
Both the Inter-American and African Commissions, located respec-
tively in Washington, D.C. and Banjul, The Gambia function as quasi-
judicial tribunals which permit broad access to individuals, groups of
individuals, and NGOs. The standing requirements for NGOs in these
commissions are considerably more liberal than those of the European
Court of Human Rights,37 which is located in Strasbourg, France and is
widely considered among the most effective international human rights
institutions in the world." Whereas the European Court accepts commu-
nications only from NGOs which are themselves victims of a violation
of the European Convention on Human Rights or its protocols,3 9 the In-
36. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect,
in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 24 (Samantha Powers
& Graham Allison eds., 2000); see also Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?
Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BuFF. HuM.
RTS. L. REV. 261, 291 (2004) (noting that "the mobilization of shame has led to numerous
breakthroughs in human rights policies both on the international and national level"). For a
series of case-studies demonstrating the positive effects of public shaming by human rights
and environmental NGOs, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 253-70
(1995).
37. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was established in 1953 to ensure
the observance of states parties' obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
European Convention, supra note 10, art. 19. Initially, cases submitted to the ECHR were
handled by the European Commission on Human Rights, which ruled on admissibility, estab-
lished the facts, and promoted friendly settlement. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 127-30, 149-51 (1996). Protocol 11, which entered into force
on November 1, 1998, eliminated the European Commission and transferred its functions to
the ECHR. Protocol 11, supra note 10.
38. See Robert Blackburn & J6rg Polakiewicz, Preface by the Editors to FUNDAMEN-
TAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER
STATES, 1950-2000 ix (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001) (noting the effect of
judgments of European Court on the conduct of European governments); Sandra Coliver, The
Right to Information Necessary for Reproductive Health and Choice Under International
Law, in THE RIGHT To KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN-
FORMATION 44 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995) (noting that decisions of the European Court are
often granted significance in other regions of the world); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1109-10 (2000) (noting that the South African Su-
preme Court, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, and the British Privy Council sitting as the
Constitutional Court of Jamaica have relied on ECHR decisions).
39. Protocol 11, supra note 10, art. 34 ("The Court may receive applications from any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the
protocols thereto."). See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 132 26 (1985) (noting that the European Commission on Human Rights had declared
inadmissible the claims filed by the National Gay Federation while allowing claims filed by
the individual applicant, who had been directly affected by the prohibition on male homosex-
ual activity under Irish law). In addition, NGOs filing petitions in the European Court are
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ter-American and African Commissions permit NGOs to file communi-
40
cations in their own names.
The Inter-American Commission has been more vigilant than the Af-
rican Commission in exploring the identity of the victim populations
whose rights a petitioning NGO purports to protect. With respect to
NGO petitions, the only explicit requirements in the Inter-American
Commission's Rules of Procedure are that the petitioning organization
be legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization
of American States and that the name and signature of a "legal represen-
tative" of the NGO be included.4 1 In its rulings on admissibility, however,
the Inter-American Commission consistently requires the existence of
identifiable individual victims, 42 whose names must be listed in the
generally required to be incorporated under domestic law, of private character, and represented
by an official with written authorization. See Olz, supra note 17, at 346.
40. See ACHR, supra note 10, art. 44 (providing that "(a)ny person or group of persons,
or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the Or-
ganization [of American States], may lodge petitions with the Commission containing
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party"); INTER-AM.
C.H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, art. 23. The African Commission Rules of Pro-
cedure once explicitly permitted communications by "organizations alleging, with proofs in
support ... serious or massive cases of violations of human and peoples' rights." AFRICAN
COMM'N RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 32, R. 114(l)(b), adopted Feb. 13, 1988. This
language was removed from the most recent Rules of Procedure. AFRICAN COMM'N RULES OF
PROCEDURE, supra note 32, R. 116, adopted Oct. 6, 1995 (providing that admissibility of
communications shall be governed by art. 56 of the African Charter, which does not address
issues of standing). Since this revision, however, the African Commission has regularly con-
sidered communications filed by NGOs. See, e.g., Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights v.
Egypt, Comm. No. 201/97, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights (2000); Legal Defence
Centre v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 219/98, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights (2000).
Cf Charter to the African Protocol, supra note 32, art. 5(3) (permitting "relevant [NGOs] with
observer status before the [African] Commission" to file cases before the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights).
41. INTER-AMER. C.H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, art. 28(a). The term
"legal representative" refers to an individual acting on behalf of the organization who may or
may not have legal skills.
42. See, e.g., Janet Espinoza Feria, et al. v. Peru, Case 12.404, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 403,
Report No. 51/02, OEA/Ser.LV/IH. 117, doc. 5 rev. 1 34-36 (2002) (finding petition admis-
sible with respect to "duly individually identified and distinguished" victims, who had aspired
to elect female candidates prevented from participating in elections due to restrictive electoral
quotas, but not with respect to 892,868 unnamed potential female candidates and female vot-
ers, although the former group was deemed to represent the interests of the latter group);
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People v. Paraguay, Case No. 12.313,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 387, Report No. 2/02, OEA/Ser.L/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 T 31 n.7 (2002) (ad-
missible petition included register of the indigenous community, which individually listed
each of its members); see also International Responsibility for the Promulgation and En-
forcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention
on Human Rights), Adv. Op. OC-14/94, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/Ser.L/V/III.31, doc. 9
IT 45-49 (1994) (noting that the "jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and
freedoms of specific individuals, not to resolve abstract questions"); Metropolitan Nature
Reserve v. Panama, Petition 11/533, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 524, Report No. 88/03,
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communication if possible. In its Report No. 48/96, the Inter-American
Commission clarified the scope of its liberal standing requirements,
which:
should not be interpreted ... to mean that a case can be pre-
sented before the Commission in abstracto. An individual
cannot institute an actio popularis and present a complaint
against a law without establishing some active legitimation justi-
fying his standing before the Commission. The applicant must
claim to be a victim of a violation of the [American] Conven-
tion, or must appear before the Commission as a representative
of a putative victim of a violation of the Convention by a state
party. It is not sufficient for an applicant to claim that the mere
existence of a law violates her rights under the American Con-
vention, it is necessary that the law have been applied to her
detriment. If the applicant fails to establish active legitimation,
the Commission must declare its incompetence rationae perso-
nae to consider the matter.44
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the Inter-American Commission
does not require NGOs to obtain authorization from victims before filing
petitions and does not explore the adequacy of the NGO's representa-
tional efforts at the outset of litigation.45
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 118, doc. 70 rev. 2 3 (2003) (finding the petition inadmissible for failure to
identify individual victims and finding the petition's scope overly broad in alleging that state-
authorized construction of a public roadway through Metropolitan Nature Reserve violated
Panamanian citizens' ights to property and due process); Banco de Lima, Case 10.169,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 423, Report No. 10/91, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.79, doc. 12 rev. 1 3 (1991) (ex-
plaining that the petition was inadmissible because the real party in interest was the Banco de
Lima, rather than the individual shareholders on whose behalf the complaint was filed).
43. INTER-AM. C.H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, art. 28(e). For practical
reasons, however, the petitioning organization need not identify with particularity each and
every victim whose rights have allegedly been violated. See Mapiripdn v. Colombia, Case
12.250, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 209, Report No. 33/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 27
(2000) (finding admissible a petition specifically identifying only two of approximately 49
victims, where the inability to recover and identify the corpses of the remaining victims
stemmed from the facts alleged by the petitioners); see also Maya Indigenous Communities v.
Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 129, Report No. 78/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20
rev. U 45-46 (2000) (finding admissible a petition lodged by Toledo Maya Cultural Council
of Belize on behalf of Mopan and Ke'ekchi Maya people of the Toledo District of Southern
Belize).
44. Emdrita Montoya Gonzd.lez v. Costa Rica, Case 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 119,
Report No. 48/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 28 (1996). But see Thomas Buergenthal,
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 237 n.43 (1981) ("That
the Inter-American Commission interprets the Convention as permitting an actio popularis
petition is readily apparent from its rules of procedure.").
45. Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama, Petition 11/553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 524,
Report No. 88/03, OEAJSer.LV/II. 118, doc. 70 rev. 2 27 (2003) ("Neither is there a re-
quirement that [petitioners] be legally empowered by the alleged victims to represent those
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The communication filed by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
(SCLDF) on behalf of the Confederaci6n De Nacionalidades Indfgenas
De La Amazonia Equatoriana (CONFENIAE), an Ecuadorian NGO,
against Ecuador illustrates the problems that may arise from these omis-
sions. CONFENIAE was an umbrella organization which claimed to
represent the interests of various indigenous communities in the Oriente
region of Ecuador. The communication charged the Ecuadorian govern-
ment with violating the rights of the Huaorani people by permitting
Conoco to build roads and undertake large-scale oil development within
46
their traditional Amazon homeland. In the course of the proceedings
before the Inter-American Commission, CONFENIAE engaged in nego-
tiations with Conoco for the sale of drilling rights on Huaorani land, an
action which the Huaorani opposed.47 The Shuar and Quichua, the Ori-
ente's largest communities, which had controlled CONFENIAE since its. . 48
founding in 1980, stood to benefit substantially 
from this initiative,
victims."); Statehood Solidarity Committee v. United States, Case 11.204, Report No. 98/03
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 725, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 118 doc. 70 rev. 2 1 (2003) (An admissible petition
filed "on behalf of the members of the Statehood Solidarity Committee and all other US citi-
zens resident in the District of Columbia," which alleged rights violations stemming from
denial of legislative voting rights to residents of the District of Columbia, named 22 members
of the Statehood Solidarity Committee.); Disabled Peoples' International et al. v. United
States, Application No. 9213, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 184, OEA/Ser.LN/II.71, doc. 9 rev. I
§ IV.C(3) (1987) (The U.S. government recognized that admissibility did not require consent
of victim.); Baby Boy, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.LV/II.54,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) (regarding the petition filed by Catholics for Christian Political Action,
which alleged violations of the right to life of "Baby Boy," an aborted fetus); Uruguay, Case
1954, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 96, Res. No. 59/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 2 (1981) (ex-
plaining that the petitioner does not require authorization from the victim). But see Report on
the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin,
OAS/Ser.LV/H.62, doc. 10 rev. 3, part 1, § M, [21-22 (1983), available at http://
www.cidh.org/countryrep/Miskitoeng/toc.htm (regarding a split in the goals of the initial
complainants, which forced the Commission to determine the actual parties to the controversy
for purposes of friendly settlement negotiations).
46. Specifically, the petitioners alleged that the Ecuadorian government, through
Conoco, was violating the rights of the Huaorani people to life and security of the person,
preservation of health and well-being, humane treatment, protection of the family, freedom of
movement, inviolability of the home, freedom of religion, property, and privacy pursuant to
the American Convention on Human Rights, the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, and the Commission's jurisprudence. Petition submitted to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights by CONFENIAE on behalf of the Huaorani Nation against
Ecuador, 4-5 (June 1, 1990). For a more complete account of the controversy that gave rise to
this case, see Thomas S. O'Connor, "We Are Part of Nature": Indigenous Peoples' Rights as a
Basis for Environmental Protection in the Amazon Basin, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
193 (1994).
47. JOE KANE, SAVAGES 72-74 (1995).
48. Id. at 73 (noting that the newly elected president of CONFENIAE, a member of the
Quichua ethnic group, had taken steps to foster conflict between the Huaorani and larger in-
digenous communities, while members of the Shuar ethnic group were moving aggressively to
take over Huaorani land).
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whereas the Huaorani had only sporadic involvement in the cash econ-
omy. 49 Because the Inter-American Commission was under no obligation
to consider, either during the admissibility phase of the proceedings or
thereafter, CONFENIAE's ability to represent the interests of the
Huaorani people in good faith, this conflict of interest initially went un-
detected.' ° The Commission's oversight appears to have been remedied
when SCLDF filed a Supplemental Report on behalf of CONFENIAE
and the Organizaci6n de la Nacionalidad Huaorani de la Amazonfa
Ecuatoriana (ONHAE).5' Although the Supplemental Report enabled the
Commission to take into account the interests of all relevant cross-
sections of the victim population,"2 this case flags the need for more rig-
orous screening standards for petitioning NGOs, especially in the
context of representing indigenous peoples or other exceptionally large
groups.
The requisite link between a petitioning NGO and the victim popula-
tion is even more ambiguous in the African Commission, which focuses
on cases which "reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive
violations of human and peoples' rights."53 Unlike the Inter-American
Commission, the African Commission accepts NGO communications in
the nature of an actio popularis, or citizens' action, challenging African
governments' laws on behalf of the public interest, regardless of whether
they have been applied to the detriment of particular individuals.54 Some
communications filed with the African Commission rely on secondary
49. See Kingsbury, supra note 13.
50. In this particular case, the conflict might not have been apparent during the admis-
sibility phase of the proceedings. The decision to negotiate with Conoco appears to have been
made by the president and vice president of CONFENIAE, who had been elected only two
months earlier. Kane, supra note 47, at 73. Prior to the election of these individuals,
CONFENIAE had been more supportive of the Huaorani, assisting them in obtaining official
title over part of their land and in founding the Organizaci6n de la Nacionalidad Huaorani de
la Amazonfa Ecuatoriana (ONHAE). Id.
51. Supplemental Report to the Petition submitted to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights by CONFENIAE and ONHAE on behalf of the Huaorani Nation against
'Ecuador (Jan. 1993) (on file with author).
52. The Commission responded to the communication in its final Report on the Situa-
tion of Human Rights in Ecuador, which set forth a list of broad recommendations to the
Ecuadorian government. These recommendations were intended to ensure, among other
things, adequate measures to protect the rights of indigenous individuals and communities
affected by oil and other development activities, meaningful and effective participation of
indigenous representatives in decision-making processes about development, and resolution of
pending claims over title, use, and control of traditionally indigenous territory. See Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1 ch. IX (1997).
53. See African Charter, supra note 32, art. 58.
54. See, e.g., Soc. & Econ. Rts. Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rts. v. Nigeria, Comm.
No. 155/96, African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, 49 (2001) [hereinafter Soc. &
Econ. Rts. Action Ctr.] (noting the "usefulness to the Commission and individuals of actio
popularis, which is wisely allowed under the African Charter").
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sources, such as accounts of violations contained in previously published
human rights reports, rather than individual testimonies collected for the
purpose of litigation.55 In certain cases, victims have reportedly inter-
vened directly to request that the African Commission disregard
communications filed by NGOs on their behalf."
The experience of student attorneys from American University's In-
ternational Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRC) before the African
Commission57 demonstrates how a forum can actively disempower vic-
tims due to the comparative ease and efficiency of dealing with NGO
representatives. 58 The petitioning NGO was the Institute for Human
Rights and Development in Africa, based in Banjul, The Gambia, which
had requested the IHRC's assistance in filing a case against the Govern-
ment of Guinea. The case intended to hold the Guinean government
accountable for rights violations committed against former Sierra
Leonean refugees in response to Guinean President Lansana Cont6's
xenophobic speech on September 9, 2000."9
In April 2002, the student attorneys joined three lawyers from the In-
stitute on a week-long fact-finding mission to Freetown, Sierra Leone.
With the assistance of the Council for Good Governance, a Sierra
55. Interview with Julia Harrington, Senior Legal Officer for Equality and Citizenship,
Open Society Justice Initiative; Former Executive Director, Institute for Human Rights and
Development in Africa (June 28, 2005). Although human rights reports are often based on
interviews with individual victims, the purpose of such interviews differs substantially from
interviews conducted with a view toward litigation. Regarding the modalities of human rights
fact-finding, see generally HANS THOOLEN & BETH VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS:
A STUDY OF THE FACT-FINDING PRACTICES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1986); Hurst Hannum, Fact-Finding by Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations, in
FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 293 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992); Diane
Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 83 (1990). Communications may not be based exclusively on mass media re-
ports. The African Commission may reject cases on the grounds that a plaintiff has not
presented sufficient, or sufficiently credible, information. In these cases, communications are
declared inadmissible for failure to make out a prima facie case. E-mail from Julia Harrington
(Nov. 30, 2004) (on file with author).
56. Presentation by Commissioner Andrew Raganayi Chigovera, Zimbabwe, Workshop
on Human Rights Litigation in Africa, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa,
Banjul, The Gambia, June 3, 2004.
57. 1 supervised this case during my three-year term as a Practitioner-in-Residence in
the International Human Rights Clinic at American University's Washington College of Law.
58. Despite these dynamics, the involvement of an NGO with resources for transporta-
tion and staff to coordinate logistics may actually increase the likelihood that victims will have
the opportunity to attend a hearing.
59. President Cont6's speech, which was broadcast on national radio, reportedly ex-
horted the Guinean population as follows: "We know that there are rebels among the refugees
... I am giving orders that we bring together all foreigners in (Guinean) neighbourhoods, so
that we know what they are doing ... and that we search and arrest suspects .... " Guinea
Rounds Up Refugees, BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/africa/919632.stm.
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Leonean NGO whose staff served as both Krio translators and "cultural
brokers,'" 6 the student attorneys, together with lawyers from the Institute,
interviewed Sierra Leonean refugees who had either personally endured
or witnessed evictions, arbitrary arrests, detentions, beatings, rapes, kill-
ings, looting and extortion of property, or forced expulsions by Guinean
soldiers, police, and civilians on or after September 9, 2000. The process
resulted in 23 notarized affidavits. By the time the student attorneys left
Sierra Leone, most of the witnesses seemed enthusiastic about the pros-
pect of testifying before the African Commission.
During its November 2003 session, the African Commission deemed
the case admissible. Seven months later, when the Commission finally
scheduled the merits hearing, the Institute arranged for three witnesses to
61attend. In preparation for the hearing, originally scheduled for Monday,
May 30, 2004, a new group of IHRC student attorneys spent two days
reinterviewing the witnesses, preparing them to testify, and reworking
opening and closing statements accordingly. The Commission postponed
the hearing several times, and the Commission's Secretariat informed the
Institute on Tuesday morning that it might not have time to hear the case
at all. The witnesses' emotional responses to the experience varied as the
hours passed, from tentativeness, to panic, to faith in the importance of
their task, to exhaustion, to complete disillusionment with the African
Commission's apparent indifference to their plight.
The low point came when the team finally entered the hearing room
on Tuesday afternoon. After permitting brief introductions, the Chairper-
son of the Commission pronounced that, in the interest of time, she did
not think it would be necessary to hear witnesses. Only after an Institute
representative assured her that the witnesses' testimonies would be ex-
62tremely brief did she relent.
These cases against Ecuador and Guinea demonstrate how liberal
standing requirements may compromise the autonomy of victims by ex-
cluding their views and voices from proceedings in the Inter-American
60. I borrowed this term from ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU
FALL DOWN 272 note (1st paperback ed., 1998).
61. Initially, the Institute had difficulty finding any of the witnesses due to the closure
of the refugee camp where most of the interviews had taken place. Fortunately, one of the
three Institute lawyers, who had since returned to live in her native Sierra Leone, was re-
sourceful enough to track down three witnesses, who agreed to attend the hearing.
62. Notwithstanding the Chairperson's apparent lack of interest in hearing the wit-
nesses' testimonies, the Commission ruled in favor of the Institute in late 2004 and ordered the
Guinean and Sierra Leonean governments to establish a joint commission to assess victims'
losses with a view toward compensation. See African Institute for Human Rights and Devel-
opment (on behalf of Sierra Leonean Refugees in Guinea)/Republic of Guinea, Comm. No.
249/2002, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rights (2004). The decision explicitly references
numerous witnesses' written affidavits. Id. at 43, 60, 73.
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and African Commissions, respectively. Such exclusion may result from
the internal politics of the petitioning NGO, as in the Ecuador case, or
from the priorities of the forum itself, as in the Guinea case. Whatever
the cause, these trends may ultimately undermine the legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness of the Inter-American and African Commissions. In addition
to eroding victims' dignity and depriving them of a vital opportunity for
healing, the consistent exclusion of victims' voices will compromise the
ability of these commissions to conduct comprehensive fact-finding and
promulgate judgments which accurately reflect, analyze, and address the
rights violations that have occurred." Moreover, the resultant jurispru-
dence, no matter how legally sophisticated, will have little resonance in
the victims' communities. 64
III. CLASS ACTIONS, CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING,
AND CRISES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Standing requirements are intended to promote fairness and judicial
efficiency by permitting only the most effective petitioner to proceed."
In U.S. courts, these requirements derive from Article III of the U.S.
Constitution,6 6 which permits courts to hear only "cases and controver-
sies" involving plaintiffs who can demonstrate that they or, in the case of
groups, their members have suffered a redressable injury caused by the
defendant.6' An organizational plaintiff must also demonstrate that the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose and
63. See JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-221 (1985)
(regarding dignitary theories and instrumental value of due process); cf. Marcy Strauss, To-
ward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.
L. REV. 315, 349 (1986-87) (concluding that "[r]espect for clients' autonomy truly ensures
that the legal system is just, not only in its results, but also in its process").
64. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 564 (1987-88) ("At a minimum,
lawyers must be sensitive to the fact that their litigation can draw poor clients into a culture
and a discourse that is likely to seem strange and intimidating.").
65. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976).
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
67. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying wildlife
conservation and other environmental organizations standing for failure to demonstrate that
regulation limiting coverage of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act to the United
States and the high seas would cause an imminent injury to one or more of their members);
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976) (dismissing as purely speculative
an indigent group's claim that an IRS code revision affecting non-profit hospitals led to denial
of request for full medical coverage); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying taxpayers
standing to challenge zoning regulations because they could not demonstrate that their desired
remedy would provide redress for their constitutional injury); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) (denying an environmental advocacy group standing to challenge the development
of a ski resort because its members were not personally injured).
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that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members .6 The belief that social change
should come about as a result of deliberation by the legislative branch,
whose members can be held accountable through the election process,
69was among the rationales behind these restrictions. Canadian and
European courts have similarly emphasized that plaintiffs should have a
personal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.7°
With the exception of the African Commission, international fora
have traditionally declined to accord standing to plaintiffs who seek to
initiate legal actions in the public interest, or actio popularis.71 States
have generally rejected actio popularis for fear that such expanded ac-
cess to their courts would directly affect their capacity to govern. For
precisely this reason, European Commission member states opposed a
proposal to grant nongovernmental environmental organizations standing
to challenge actions and omissions of public authorities that allegedly
contravene environmental law.72
William Aceves has proposed that adoption of certain criteria from
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23)-namely, commonality,
73
68. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
69. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988).
70. See THOMAS A. CROMWELL, Locus STANDI: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
STANDING IN CANADA 4 (1986) (noting that Canadian courts require litigants to have a "suffi-
cient personal interest" or be a "sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested
persons") (quoting P.M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156
(2d ed. 1973)); MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PER-
SPECTIVE 218 (2001) (noting that German courts require a "personal and direct interest on the
part of the applicant") (quoting P. VAN DIJK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
AND THE REQUIREMENT OF AN INTEREST TO SUE 197 (1980)); Michael J. Remington, The
Tribunaux Adminstratifs: Protectors of the French Citizen, 51 TUL. L. REV. 33, 68 (1976)
(noting that French courts require that "plaintiffs ... must have some personal interest in the
proceedings").
71. See, e.g., South West Africa, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 6, 47 (July 18) (noting that actio popularis "is not known to international law as it
stands at present"); see also Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga
Omnes?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 277-80 (2001) (noting that the International Court of
Justice has never granted standing based on offenses erga omnes).
72. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, COM(03)624 final, Explanatory
Memorandum § 5.1. In preparing the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, which emerged from the consultation process, the Commission discounted most of the
member states' objections. See id. The Commission did, however, omit provisions that would
have accorded legal standing to groups without legal personality. See id. The Commission also
rejected a proposal by nongovernmental organizations to accord them unlimited actio popu-
laris standing, which would have alleviated the requirement that nonenvironmental
organizations demonstrate a "sufficient interest" in or "maintain the impairment of a right"
resulting from the challenged act or omission of a public authority that allegedly contravenes
environmental law. See id. §§ 5.2, 6 art. 4.
73. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring commonality as a way of limiting a putative
class to those members whose cases present common questions of law or fact).
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typicality, 4 and adequacy of representation75 -could help to avoid the
problems associated with an actio popularis in the context of interna-
tional human rights litigation." Although Aceves focuses on cases filed
in regional and other human rights fora by groups of individuals, the rep-
resentation-related issues arising in cases filed by NGOs are sufficiently
similar to make his analysis relevant to the present discussion. While
Aceves' proposal could limit the ability of certain questionable NGOs to
file communications in regional human rights commissions, the auton-
omy of victims may still be at risk.77
Empirical evidence demonstrates that most U.S. courts approve class
representatives and class counsel with little or no analysis of criteria
bearing on their adequacy." As a result, the class representative is often
"more a figurehead than an actual decisionmaker. 79 Even if class
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring typicality to ensure that class representatives are
sufficiently invested in the matter to pursue it zealously and have a close enough connection to
other class members to represent their interests).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that plaintiff class is fairly and adequately repre-
sented by the lead plaintiff(s) and counsel); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (enumerating criteria courts
must consider in appointing class counsel, including work to identify or investigate potential
claims, past experience handling similar claims and complex litigation, knowledge of applica-
ble law, and available resources).
76. See William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 399-401. But see Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights
Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 648 (noting
that "[i]nternational human rights class actions fit uncomfortably within Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23").
77. Aceves himself acknowledges this risk, but proposes to address it through a rigor-
ous class certification process including opt-out provisions. See Aceves, supra note 76, at
396-97,401-02.
78. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary's Flawed Application of Rule 23's "Adequacy
of Representation" Requirement, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 671, 682 (noting that courts have
"approved class representatives despite significant evidence that the representatives lacked
even basic knowledge about the case"). See also Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not
Enough: Assuring More Than Merely "Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L.
REV. 927, 989 (2004) (advising a more careful application of the adequacy of representation
requirement to ensure fairness and due process); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seri-
ously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004) (concluding that "courts pay lip service to the concept of
adequate representation but fail to robustly engage in any meaningful inquiry").
79. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 406 (2000); see also Paul
Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: Fools for Clients, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 244-46
(1980) (questioning whether the class representative is a "mere formality" in the lawyer-driven
class litigation model); Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARiz. L.
REV. 923, 927 (1998) ("[C]lass representatives often are recruited by class counsel, play no
client role whatsoever, and-when deposed ... commonly show no understanding of their
litigation."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 71 (1991) (noting that the "plaintiffs' attorney dominates the litigation
regardless of whether the representative plaintiff is a complete stranger or the attorney's
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representatives play a more active role in the litigation, their perspectives
may not accurately reflect the full range of views held by class mem-
bers. o Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Supreme Court has
emphasized the need for class representatives and, implicitly, class coun-
sel to consult with other class members about the merits of cases and the
appropriateness of accepting settlement offers.8
As Aceves acknowledges, the risk of alienating members of the vic-
tim population is exacerbated in litigation in international fora due to
religious, cultural, nationality, and other differences between lawyers
and class members. The same risk exists in human rights class action
litigation in U.S. courts pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
which provides that U.S. federal courts shall have jurisdiction over "a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations."83 Since the
landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed that victims of human rights abuses
abroad could seek legal redress in U.S. courts against foreign perpetra-
tors, 84 creative lawyers have used this statute to enforce international
human rights norms. Catherine MacKinnon characterizes the lawyer's
relationship to unnamed class members in ATCA litigation as follows:
"[O]ne claims to represent huge numbers of people with whom one has
no contact, speaking for them in public or policy settings, taking posi-
tions on issues that deeply and directly affect their lives, on which they
have diverse and nuanced opinions."85 Other scholars have similarly em-
phasized the potential disconnect between advocates and victims in the
brother-in-law"); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183,
1204 (1982) (asserting that "in many instances, named representatives are paper organizations
or individuals who lack the expertise, organization, or resources to play a meaningful role in
formulating litigation objectives").
80. See Rhode, supra note 79, at 1185 (suggesting a theory of representation that
"mandates full disclosure of ... class sentiment"); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE
L.J. 470, 485-88 (1976) (noting the tensions among the minority parent class members, as
well as between some class members and the NAACP in desegregation cases); Lawrence M.
Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 709, 734
(1989) (noting that, barring a conflict of interest, courts will not ordinarily inquire as to what
role clients play in decisionmaking); Klonoff, supra note 78, at 673 (noting that the "vast
majority of U.S. courts perform virtually no gate-keeping function and approve class represen-
tatives and class counsel with little or no analysis"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy
of Adequate Representation, 75 Thx. L. REV. 571, 605-06 (1997) (noting that even adequate
representation can conflict with class members' right to be heard).
81. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981).
82. See Aceves, supra note 76, at 397. These obstacles seem to undermine the feasibil-
ity of Aceves' proposal for a rigorous class certification process.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
84. See 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Collective Harms Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Cau-
tionary Note on Class Actions, 6 ILSA J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 567, 573 (2000).
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context of ATCA litigation, which may deprive the latter of the full reha-
bilitative benefits of this process."
In an effort to afford victims a more meaningful experience, some
scholars have proposed a client-centered approach to class action litiga-
tion.87 By contrast with the traditional lawyering model, in which
lawyers function as experts who provide advice with minimal client in-
put, client-centered lawyering actively involves the client in identifying
problems, generating a range of options, and making decisions." The
underlying assumption is that clients are in a better position than lawyers
to understand the economic, social, and psychological dimensions of
their problems and to evaluate potential solutions by balancing relevant
legal and nonlegal concerns. By integrating clients into the decision-
making process, the client-centered approach seeks to restore their
autonomy and dignity and thereby increase the likelihood they will be
satisfied with the end results. 90
Although the demands of class action litigation indisputably require
the lawyer to play a more directive role than in individual client repre-
sentation,9" client-centered lawyering techniques can help to ensure such
86. See Van Schaack, supra note 34, at 321-22; see also M.O. Chibundu, Making Cus-
tomary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1069, 1108 (1999) ("[I]t is hard to imagine how the class victim thousands of miles
away from U.S. shores and with at most the dimmest conception of the complicated proceed-
ings that go on in American courthouses can possibly share a sense of justice from these
proceedings."); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 93 (1995) ("A
mass human rights tort trial inevitably compromises claim autonomy....").
87. See Grosberg, supra note 80, at 709; see also Van Schaack, supra note 34, at 281
(emphasizing the importance of "providing victims with a meaningful experience" and "pro-
moting ... human dignity" through ATCA litigation).
88. See DAvID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 17-18, 22-23 (1991); see also DAVID F CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION:
A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS 51-52 (2002) (defining client-
centeredness as a type of legal representation that "expands the role of the client as decision-
maker and colleague in the lawyer-client relationship and places additional demands on the
lawyer to make this role a reality").
89. See BINDER, supra note 88, at 17.
90. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 168-69 (1974)
(noting that client participation in problem solving promotes dignity and increases client satis-
faction with the results). But see Ellmann, supra note 2, at 1122 ("Principles of client-centered
practice suggest that even within th[e] attorney-client dyad, the client's autonomy is still in
danger from lawyers who wittingly or unwittingly override the client's own wishes in favor of
outcomes that the lawyers prefer.").
91. See Grosberg, supra note 80, at 713 ("Class action clients, by contrast [with indi-
vidual clients], cannot collectively be the primary decisionmaker, especially if the class is
large or its members have conflicting interests."); see also Coffee, supra note 79, at 417-18
(noting that client autonomy "can only be incompletely realized at best in representative litiga-
tion where the attorney is not simply an agent of the client ... [but] also the creditor and joint
venturer").
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litigation is responsive to the views of the broadest possible spectrum of
class members. Lawrence Grosberg recommends, for example, that law-
yers confirm the typicality of proposed class representatives by sampling
putative class members and keeping class members apprised of the scope• 92
of ongoing consultations. Although the viability of implementing these
strategies in remote areas of the developing world is doubtful,93 the need
to ensure that class representatives effectively represent the interests of
absentee members is no less critical. Moreover, given the minimal likeli-
hood of enforcing most damage awards in the international arena,
lawyers must effectively educate class members about the broader pur-
poses of the litigation to ensure they remain invested in the process.
In the context of ATCA litigation, Beth van Schaack recommends
the selection of "natural leaders" who have already represented the
community in denouncing or responding to abuses. 94 Other experienced
practitioners caution that the most charismatic or outspoken individuals
in a group are not always the most sensitive to the group's needs.95 The
authenticity of such individuals' claims to leadership should thus be con-
tinually reevaluated.
Van Schaack further emphasizes the importance of engaging a
broader cross-section of the victim population in the litigation process
through the establishment of notice regimes and effective outreach. 96 By
way of example, van Schaack cites the opt-in scheme adopted by a Ha-
waii district court in a case filed by Filipino victims of the Marcos
regime and the elaborate notice regimes employed in Holocaust-related
cases.97 Where feasible, such techniques give victims an effective
92. See Grosberg, supra note 80, at 747 n. 176, 753, 755-56, 766-68, 774. To the extent
that the lawyer failed to fulfill these obligations, the court could intervene pursuant to its dis-
cretionary supervisory authority under Rule 23(d). See id. at 750. Cf Mary Kay Kane, Of
Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tx. L. REV. 385, 405
(1987) (suggesting that deeper judicial involvement in the entire class action process, includ-
ing closer cooperation between the judge and plaintiffs' counsel, could help eliminate some of
the conflicts that arise in class actions between class representatives and class members).
93. But see Kingsbury, supra note 13, at 5 (proposing the use of polling devices or
other local processes to establish the preferences of large groups involved in international
human rights litigation).
94. See Van Schaack, supra note 34, at 345.
95. Telephone Interview with Viviana Krsticevic, Executive Director, CEJIL (Oct. 7,
2005); E-mail from Cynthia Morel, Legal Cases Officer, Minority Rights Group International
(Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with author). For this reason, the London-based Minority Rights Group
(MRG) tries, wherever possible, to deal with traditional or elected leaders. Id. Even where
such leaders do not include women, MRG works to ensure the inclusion of a gender-sensitive
perspective. Id.
96. See Van Schaack, supra note 34, at 345-46.
97. See id. at 351, nn.411-12 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F.
Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d
164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
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"voice" in the proceedings,98 although technological, logistical, linguis-
tic, cultural, and security barriers often preclude using them in many
parts of the developing world.
Acknowledging these practical obstacles to communication with vic-
tims, many human rights NGOs define their raison d'etre as giving
"voice to the voiceless."99 Some of these groups have made significant
inroads through a variety of strategies, including litigation, fact-finding,
legislative advocacy, and public education. Despite their increasing in-
fluence in the international arena, however, international law does not
hold NGOs accountable for their conduct.' °° Existing informal controls
are also inadequate to ensure that they execute their activities responsi-
bly.
101
Denouncing the lack of any mechanism to evaluate NGOs' represen-
tational authority, one scholar concludes that many NGOs are "little
more than self-appointed and self-created lobbies. ' '  Such
98. See id. at 346; see also Coffee, supra note 79, at 419 n.134, 437, & 437 n.166 (em-
phasizing the importance of enhancing the "voice" of class members in institutional reform
litigation where inconsistent outcomes are unacceptable).
99. For example, both the Kenya Community Media Network and the India-based Peo-
ples' Vigilance Committee on Human Rights explicitly define their mandates this way. See
Kenya Community Media Network, http://www.kcomnet.org; see also CAROLINE SZYBER,
U.N. ONLINE NETWORK IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, GIVING VOICE TO THE
VOICELESS: A FIELD STUDY FROM INDIA ABOUT CAPACITY BUILDING TOWARDS WOMEN IN
PANCHAYATS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR EMPOWERMENT, Appendix 111 (2005), available at
http://unpanl.un.org.
100. See generally Blitt, supra note 36; see also Thomas R. DeGregori, NGOs, Trans-
genic Food, Globalization, and Conservation, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 115, 127
(2002) ("NGOs demand good governance and transparency from all institutions except them-
selves."); Peter J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations:
Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161, 166 (2002) ("NGOs have not been held respon-
sible for their conduct; they cannot violate international law or agreements.").
101. See Blitt, supra note 36, at 321-22, 325-32, 367-79 (critiquing the ability of mem-
bers, trustees, donors, host governments, the media, intergovernmental organizations, and
international tribunals to regulate NGO conduct); see also Ramon C. Casiple, Waiting for
Justice in the Marcos Litigation, HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE (Carnegie Council on Ethics and Int'l
Aff., New York, N.Y.) Spring 2000, at 8, available at http://www.cceia.org/media/608-hrd2-
2.pdf (noting that victims' interests do not always coincide with those of their advocates).
102. Andrew Hurrell, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply
Divided World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 277, 289 (T. Dunne & N.J. Wheeler
eds., 1999); see also Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International
Law, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Summer 2003, at 2-3 (noting that "lack of regulation
raises questions about NGO representativity and legitimacy"); Ratner, supra note 11, at 533
(noting that NGOs lack "accountability... to anyone other than their members and donors");
P. J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, FOREIGN POL'v, Fall 1998, at 82 (asserting that
many NGOs are "decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to
represent"); Slim, supra note 25, 26 (explaining that "simply being part of the new sacred
space of 'civil society' is not enough to guarantee an NGO's legitimacy"); Peter J. Spiro, New
Global Potentates: NGOs and the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 963
(1996) (noting that unelected NGO leaders are unlikely to be scrutinized by their member-
ships).
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well-respected human rights NGOs as Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and the International Federation of Human Rights have
expressed concern that the lack of formal distinctions between them-
selves and more partisan NGOs may erode their credibility.' °3
Nonetheless, human rights NGOs have adamantly rejected proposals for
regulation for fear of compromising their independence.'
4
IV. THE NEED FOR A LAWYER- NGO-VICTIM TRIAD
The increasing challenges to NGO accountability, together with the
unique dynamics of litigation by NGOs in the Inter-American and Afri-
can Commissions, render the traditional lawyer-client dyad obsolete in
this context, especially where the real party in interest is a large group of
victims. The mechanics of filing petitions with regional human rights
commissions differ from one NGO to another. Some NGOs have staff
lawyers whose responsibilities include such projects, while others retain
outside counsel for this purpose.' °5 In-house and outside counsel may
also work together on different aspects of a case. ' °6 Regardless of the
particular representation arrangement selected, the identity of the client
becomes harder to pinpoint as the size of the victim group increases. To
improve the likelihood that a petitioning NGO effectively represents the
interests of a victim group, the lawyer-client dyad should be recast as a
lawyer-NGO-victim triad in which the lawyer and the petitioning NGO
103. See Martens, supra note 102, at 8.
104. See Blitt, supra note 36, at 263 n.10 (noting that the launch of www.ngowatch.org
by two U.S.-based conservative foundations triggered "strident opposition" among the NGO
community); see also Benedict Kingsbury, The Democratic Accountability of Non-
Governmental Organizations: First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture:
Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society,
3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183, 183, 186 (2002) (noting that "an operational code resembling First
Amendment liberalism has been the de facto guide in the construction of international civil
society" which creates problems of accountability).
105. Although the filing of petitions with regional human rights commissions does not
require a lawyer, most cases involve lawyers in some capacity. See INTER-AM. C.H.R. RULES
OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, art. 23 (2000) ("The petitioner may designate an attorney or
other person to represent him or her before the Commission, either in the petition itself or in
another writing.") (emphasis added). The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights do not address the subject of representation by counsel. See AFRI-
CAN COMM'N RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 32.
106. See, e.g., E-mail with attached sample MRG partnership agreements from Cynthia
Morel, Legal Cases Officer, Minority Rights Group International (Sept. 28, 2005) (on file with
author) (explaining that work on behalf of indigenous peoples is "conducted in a tripartite
fashion: the victim/community, the domestic lawyer, and MRG," with the local partner organi-
zation assuming ownership of the case and MRG playing an advisory role); Sample Working
Agreement Between CEJIL and Local Representatives of the Victims (on file with author)
(expressing the understanding that CEJIL and the victims' local representatives will jointly
design litigation strategy, draft and present pleadings, and appear at hearings).
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have joint fiduciary obligations to victims, who are the real parties in
interest. Where the alleged rights violations include the death of some or
all of the victims, the triad will have to be reconfigured to replace the
deceased with their next of kin.
The proposed fiduciary obligations are targeted to ensure meaningful
representation of the affected victim group, however large. At a mini-
mum, they should include duties to obtain free, prior, and informed
consent of the victim group before initiating litigation, to keep the victim
group apprised of developments as the litigation unfolds, and to incorpo-
rate victims' voices into the process. Although these objectives may
seem self-evident to domestic litigators, their application to regional
human rights litigation, which often spans several countries and involves
communities in remote locations without access to e-mail, telephone, or
other technology, may be challenging.'0 7
In order to fulfill the proposed fiduciary obligations, advocates will
have to define the relevant victim group-or prospective victim group
for purposes of filing an actio popularis with the African Commission-
at the outset of the litigation. In cases where victims are not well-
organized, advocates should make a good faith effort to facilitate com-
munication among group members. Where victims' capacity to interact
with their advocates is limited due, for example, to minority status, de-
tention, mental disabilities, or security risks, certain objectives may not
be fully attainable.'08 However, the advocates' fact-finding methodology
should be sufficiently sound to ensure that group members' priorities
drive the litigation.
A. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
The right of free, prior, and informed consent is well-established in
the context of international development. Numerous international in-
struments concerning the rights of indigenous peoples affirm this right,
107. The achievement of these objectives :n class action litigation in U.S. courts has
proven similarly elusive.
108. The client-centered approach is similarly inapplicable in such situations. See
BINDER, supra note 88, at 20 n.17 (noting that the client-centered approach cannot be used
where the client has not reached majority or suffers from mental incapacity). Cf. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2002) ("When a client's capacity to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of
minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.").
109. See, e.g., General Recommendation XXIII on Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Office of
the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
4(d), CERD/C/51/Misc.13/Rev.4 (Aug. 18, 1997) (calling upon states to "[e]nsure that
members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public
life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their
informed consent"); Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. DOC.
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as does the jurisprudence of the Inter-American" ° and African"' human
rights systems. The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations has
elaborated on the substantive and procedural aspects of this concept:
Substantively, the principle of free, prior and informed consent
recognizes indigenous peoples' inherent and prior rights to their
lands and resources and respects their legitimate authority to re-
quire that third parties enter into an equal and respectful
relationship with them based on the principle of informed con-
sent. Procedurally, free, prior and informed consent requires
processes that allow and support meaningful choices by indige-
nous peoples about their development path."'
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, 34 I.L.M. 541 (Oct. 28, 1994) (requiring states to obtain free and
informed consent of indigenous peoples regarding relocation (art. 10), takings of cultural,
intellectual, religious, and spiritual property (art. 12), legislative or administrative measures
that may affect them (art. 20), and projects affecting their lands, territories and other resources
(arts. 27, 30); Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries, ILO Convention No. 169, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5,
1990) (prohibiting relocation of indigenous peoples without "free and informed consent"
except as an exceptional measure (art. 16) and requiring consultations regarding development
activities and exploration or exploitation of resources pertaining to their lands (arts. 6, 7, 15);
see also Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-
Comm. on Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, 10, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug.
26, 2003) (requiring transnational corporations and other business enterprises to respect the
principle of free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous peoples and communities to be
affected by their development projects); The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries,
Striking a Better Balance: The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review, vol. 1, at 50
(Dec. 2003) [hereinafter EIR Report] (characterizing free, prior, and informed consent as an
internationally guaranteed right for indigenous peoples and part of "obtaining social license
and demonstrable public acceptance for the project" in the case of non-indigenous local com-
munities).
110. See Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 860,
Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./II. 117, doc. 5 rev. I 131 (2002) (construing Inter-American
human rights law to require "special measures to ensure recognition of the particular and col-
lective interest that indigenous people have in the occupation and use of their traditional lands
and resources and their right not to be deprived of this interest except with fully informed
consent, under conditions of equality, and with fair compensation").
Ill. See Soc. & Econ. Rts. Action Ctr., supra note 54, 58 (holding that the Nigerian
government's failure to involve the Ogoni communities in decisions affecting the development
of Ogoniland constituted a violation of their right to dispose freely of their wealth and natural
resources under art. 21 of the African Charter).
112. See Standard Setting, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Sub-Comm. on
the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, 13, 22nd Sess., Agenda Item 5, 13 U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2004/4 (2004) [hereinafter Standard Setting]. See also EIR Report, supra
note 109, 150:
Free prior and informed consent should not be understood as a one-off, yes-no vote
or as a veto power for a single person or group. Rather, it is a process by which in-
digenous peoples, local communities, government, and companies may come to
mutual agreements in a forum that gives affected communities enough leverage to
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More specifically, this principle is intended to ensure that indigenous
peoples receive comprehensive information in an accessible and under-
standable form about the scope and expected impact of proposed
development activities on their land, resources, and well-being, includ-
ing all reasonably foreseeable risks to the affected community; that their
approval is sought and obtained without coercion, pressure, or intimida-
tion; and that their choices are respected and upheld.
"3 Appropriate
modalities of communication may vary from one group to another, or
may even depend on the activity involved, but existing governance struc-
tures should generally be respected.14
Obtaining free, prior, and informed consent of victim groups is simi-
larly critical prior to initiating litigation in regional human rights
commissions. This practice will help to ensure that victims' rights are not
trampled by their representatives, compounding the governmental abuses
that gave rise to the litigation. " ' At a minimum, lawyers or petitioning
NGOs should be required to apprise the victims, through linguistically and
culturally appropriate channels, of the purpose of the proposed litigation,
its various stages and their expected duration, the nature and likelihood of
available relief, potential negative repercussions, and opportunities for
their involvement. In particular, victims should be informed, and reminded
as often as necessary, that even if monetary damages are awarded, the
prospect of collecting them is minimal in most cases.
As in the development context, group members should have an oppor-
tunity to request additional information or clarification, seek outside
advice, and invoke their internal decisionmaking processes outside the
presence of their advocates before deciding whether to proceed with the
litigation."' Such a discussion may also give advocates a more complete
picture of the prospect of reprisals by the target government and permit the
implementation of appropriate protective measures where necessary. Con-
sultations are unlikely to involve one-on-one communication with each
member of the victim group. The time required may vary depending on
the number of victims involved, their level of education, their gender or
negotiate conditions under which they may proceed and an outcome leaving the
community clearly better off.
113. See Standard Setting, supra note 112, IM 14, 20.
114. Id. 20, 21.
115. On a more practical note, if advocates fail to obtain consent, another lawyer or
NGO could take over the case. CEJIL's practice of obtaining powers of representation from all
group members involved in litigation before the Inter-American Commission alleviates this
possibility. Telephone Interview with Viviana Krsticevic, Executive Director, CEJIL (Oct. 15,
2005).
116. Cf. Standard Setting, supra note 112, 22; Ellmann, supra note 2, at 1151-52 (rec-
ommending that lawyers representing organizational clients give a group's leaders primary
responsibility for shaping decisionmaking methods).
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other distinctive characteristics, the nature of the group to which they be-
long, the complexity of the issues, and the scope of the proposed
litigation. ' Advocates must be particularly sensitive to prevailing power
dynamics and avoid leading questions, which may prompt victims to give
a particular answer. Whatever the outcome of these processes, the decision
of the victim group must be respected."8
The modalities of effective consultation should be tailored to the needs
of the victim group. The lawyer or petitioning NGO might utilize a previ-
ously scheduled traditional assembly or town meeting, conduct a house-to-
house survey, designate local human rights activists as their proxies, or
communicate with the community's freely chosen representatives, who can
then utilize their own networks to disseminate information. The difficulty
of identifying genuine representatives in a foreign setting should not be
underestimated, If so-called "natural leaders" present themselves, advo-
cates should confirm their bona fides in a respectful manner which
emphasizes the best interests of the group involved in the litigation and
serves to advance, rather than thwart, the process of trust-building. If not,
input from human rights activists or foreign scholars who have undertaken
field research in the relevant country may be helpful in choosing representa-
tives. Such experts may also be able to provide critical information
regarding divergent interests of particular subgroups, which may indicate
the need for additional representatives in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
B. Ongoing Communication
The process of obtaining free, prior, and informed consent of group
members should provide sufficient insight into internal community dy-
namics to facilitate the establishment of channels of communication which
can be utilized for the duration of the litigation. If genuine community
representatives are identified, they can serve as useful points of contact for
lawyers and petitioning NGOs. An expression of interest by "outsiders"
whether lawyers or NGOs, may itself prompt the designation of represen-
tatives and even serve as a catalyst for broader community mobilization.
However, where such representatives are not readily accessible by tele-
phone or e-mail, advocates may have to enlist the assistance of a reliable
intermediary to keep victims informed of developments in the litigation,
solicit victims' input when necessary, and monitor any continuing viola-
tions or reprisals by the target government.
117. Cf Standard Setting, supra note 112, 22; Telephone Interview with Viviana
Krsticevic, Executive Director, CEJIL (Oct. 15, 2005).
118. Cf Standard Setting, supra note 112, 27 (emphasizing importance of
"[i]ndigenous peoples' right to withhold consent or to say 'no' to inappropriate development").
119. Cf Kingsbury, supra note 13, at 3 (calling for "a two-way process of translation and
adaptation between plaintiffs [in human rights litigation] and their lawyers").
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Once a case is filed, advocates may feel less need for regular contact
with the affected community. Both the Inter-American and African Com-
missions meet only twice a year, which makes the pace of their cases
extremely protracted. Moreover, the merits phase, in which the victims'
voices can and should be incorporated, is normally preceded by a hearing
on admissibility, which is highly legalistic. Pending opportunities for more
constructive involvement by the victims, their advocates must keep them
engaged in the litigation despite the passage of time and periodically con-
firm their desire to pursue the litigation. Especially when the case is partS 120
of a broader strategy to address the community's problems, ongoing
communication among all relevant participants is particularly important.
C. The Transformative Potential of Storytelling
Feeling "heard," whether by a single sympathetic listener or a
broader audience, is essential to the process of recovery for victims and
survivors."21 In order for victims of traumatic events to begin healing,
they must learn to live with traumatic memories.1
22 By allowing victims
to confront in a supportive environment the painful experiences they
have suffered, storytelling prevents the internalization of suffering and
resentment 123 which, if left unaddressed, can perpetuate the cycle of vio-
114
lence and lead to further abuses.
120. Regarding the use of litigation in the context of organizing, see, for example, White,
supra note 64, at 545-46 (reconceptualizing a lawsuit as "an occasion for poor people to join
together, outside of the formal boundaries of the litigation, in spaces that are parallel to it, to
engage among themselves in reflective conversation and strategic action"); Kingsbury, supra
note 13, at 3 ("For human rights litigation to meet its potential as a means of political expres-
sion and community mobilization for human rights victims depends, in part, on the
extrajudicial skills of the lawyers who represent them.'); Marsico, supra note 1, at 658-63
(proposing a model of "facilitative lawyering" in which the lawyer's role is limited to provid-
ing technical legal advice and assistance sought by the client).
121. See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 210 (1992) (noting that "the
survivor draws power from her ability to stand up in public and speak the truth without fear of
the consequences").
122. See Christopher J. Colvin, 'We Are Still Struggling': Storytelling, Reparations and
Reconciliation after the TRC, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION
(2000), at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papcolv.htm ("As with most trauma therapy, the em-
phasis is always on the traumatic event(s) itself and trying to find ways to live with traumatic
memories without repeating them.").
123. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1269 (2000) (quoting Albie Sachs, Lecture at Columbia
University School of Law (Apr. 13, 1999)); see also HERMAN, supra note 121, at 222-23
(explaining that storytelling "serves a purpose beyond simple ventilation or catharsis; it is a
means toward active mastery"); but see Colvin, supra note 122 ("[S]ome members are
reluctant... to speak since the[y] say it will only stir up anger and hatred in themselves or in
those who are listening... ").
124. See Drumbl, supra note 123, at 1288 ("[P]olicies [deemphasizing victim participation]
aggravate social division, procrastinate the determination of accountability, and sow mistrust.').
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Storytelling can also play a critical role in restoring victims' dig-.1 2 5
nity. The storytelling process was a central feature of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in which victims' stories were
often corroborated by the testimonies of their aggressors,1 26 and served as
a rallying point for more far-reaching political action in some cases.
' 7
Similarly, an Australian government commission of inquiry established
that "being heard" was as important to victims as compensation; the sub-
sequent adoption of a requirement that judges review Victim Impact
Statements at sentencing reportedly increased victims' satisfaction with
the criminal justice system. 121 Plaintiffs in ATCA litigation have likewise
confirmed the empowering effect of confronting their abusers in U.S.
federal courts. 9
These successes underscore the importance of incorporating victims'
voices into case preparation and presentation. The process of eliciting a
victim's personal experience through an initial interview, however time-
consuming, may be the first opportunity accorded the victim to give
voice to the abuses suffered and affirm their gravity. If foreign lawyers
are involved in interviewing, they should work in collaboration with lo-
cal advocates who, having received the requisite training, can continue to
gather evidence after their foreign counterparts have left the country.
Victims should also be invited and encouraged to testify in the proceed-
ings, and regional human rights commissions could facilitate their
involvement by scheduling at least one session of the merits phase in the
target country."3 The submission of detailed declarations from a repre-
125. See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth
and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1440 (2002) (not-
ing that victims may be motivated to tell their stories in order to "'clear' their family
members' or their own reputation and to restore their dignity").
126. See Drumbl, supra note 123, at 1269 ("The fact that the [South African] aggressors
in their testimony fully corroborated so many victim stories lends these stories an undeniabil-
ity that contrasts with the systematic denials that can result from the adversarial trial
system."); see also Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, Note, An International "Truth Commission":
Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
223 (2003) (describing one purpose of the proposed Truth Commission as providing an "op-
portunity for victims to be vindicated through publicly telling and memorializing their story").
127. See Colvin, supra note 122 (tracing the progression of a storytelling group, formed
under the South African post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission, from its ini-
tially powerless victimized state towards a justice-seeking political role).
128. See EDNA EREZ, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 33, VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 2 (Sept. 1991), available
at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti33.pdf.
129. See Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 485, 485 (2001); SANDRA COLIVER ET AL., HOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS
ACCOUNTABLE BY USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS, ADVOCACY EFFORTS
AND COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGIES 7, at http://www.cja.org/projects/writingsdocs/
AccountabilityColiverGreenHoffman.pdf.
130. I appreciate this idea from Beth Stephens.
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sentative cross-section of victims, together with the presentation of oral
testimony by some or all of them,' should ensure that the forum has
reliable information about the nature and scope of relevant abuses.
Obviously, time, resource, and efficiency constraints preclude the
possibility of having every victim testify or even attend the proceedings.
Accordingly, advocates must work to ensure they convey critical devel-
opments in the proceedings and the ultimate decision rendered by the
forum to the victim group. While the effectiveness of particular strate-
gies will vary depending on the context, available options include
organizing press conferences, disseminating e-mail updates, making ar-
rangements with a local radio program for witnesses to recount their
experience of testifying, publishing victims' testimonies in a newsletter,
or providing funding for a journalist from the target country to attend the
proceedings.' 32 Given that the decisions of regional human rights com-
missions are not legally enforceable, the development of broad public
consciousness of such decisions, both within the victim group and be-
yond, is indispensable if they are to have any lasting effect.
V. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
Implementation of the lawyer-NGO-victim triad is complicated by
the fact that the foregoing proposals, while framed in the language of
fiduciary obligations among lawyers, petitioning NGOs, and victim
groups, also affect the relationships between all of these actors and the
relevant forum. At the most basic level, these proposals are intended to
give victims maximum autonomy over litigation in regional human
rights commissions. The requirements of free, prior, and informed con-
sent and ongoing communication ensure that victims decide of their own
accord to undertake litigation, effectively authorize a particular lawyer or
petitioning NGO (or both) to represent their interests, and have the op-
portunity to participate in strategic decisionmaking as the case unfolds.
The requirement of an opportunity to be heard permits at least some of
the victims to give voice to the abuses they have suffered and start heal-
ing.
131. Neither the Inter-American nor the African Commission requires the submission of
a written declaration before hearing in-person testimony. E-mail from Richard Wilson, Profes-
sor, American University Washington College of Law (July 5, 2005) (on file with author); E-
mail from Julia Harrington, Senior Legal Officer for Equality and Citizenship, Open Society
Justice Initiative; Former Executive Director, Institute for Human Rights and Development in
Africa (July 25, 2005) (on file with author).
132. The Center for Justice and Accountability, a California-based NGO, regularly em-
ploys this practice in ATCA cases. Telephone Interview with Sandy Coliver, Executive
Director, Center for Justice and Accountability (Dec. 4, 2004).
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At the same time, these proposals have the potential to bolster the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the forum. By obtaining free, prior, and
informed consent of the victim group, advocates will be in a better posi-
tion to consult regularly with the different cross-sections of that
population. By using established channels of communication to remain
in contact with victims over the course of the proceedings, advocates can
monitor their needs and goals, which may change over time, and help to
ensure that the litigation resonates with the people whose rights are at
issue. By giving victims an opportunity to be heard, advocates will be
better equipped to present the best available evidence.
Given the overlapping interests implicated by these proposals and
the spectrum of actors involved, different modes of implementation are
possible. These include promulgation of a code of professional conduct
for international human rights lawyers, the development of norms on
NGO accountability, and amendment of the commissions' current stand-
ing requirements. Each of these options is discussed below.
A. Code of Professional Conduct for
International Human Rights Lawyers
Traditionally, lawyers' ethical obligations have been embodied in
codes of professional conduct, which are enforced by local or national
bar associations. These codes provide sparse guidance regarding transna-tional . 133
tional practice. To the extent that lawyers remain bound by their home
countries' codes of professional conduct when litigating in international
fora, their ethical obligations may differ from those of their adversaries.
Divergent conceptions of the lawyer's role in different parts of the
world have made the development of universally applicable ethical stan-
dards exceedingly difficult.' 34 The first of two major attempts at
codification of international ethical standards is the International Bar
Association's International Code of Ethics (IBA Code), a set of 21 non-
binding general principles which, by its own terms, serves only as "a
guide as to what the International Bar Association considers to be a de-
133. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002) ("The choice of
law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law,
treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdic-
tions provide otherwise."). See also Malini Majumdar, Ethics in the International Arena: The
Need for Clarification, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 439, 441, 444-47 (1995) (discussing the in-
adequacies of the American Bar Association's approach to regulating American lawyers'
ethical obligations in transnational practice).
134. See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the
Global Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 931, 943-44 (2001) (contrasting the
United States' libertarian ideology, which places the client's cause above all else, with legal
practice in Europe, which places more emphasis on the lawyer's duty to serve as an officer of
the court).
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sirable course of conduct by all lawyers engaged in the international
practice of law."'35 The only provisions of the IBA Code that bear di-
rectly on the lawyer-client relationship relate to zealous advocacy,
candor, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and confidentiality. The second
attempt is the Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community
(CCBE Code), which has been implemented in all of the member states
of the European Community. 116 The CCBE Code contains more detailed
provisions regarding the lawyer-client relationship, requiring lawyers to
represent clients "promptly, conscientiously and diligently," keep clients
informed as to the progress of their cases, avoid conflicts of interest, seg-
regate client funds, and purchase professional indemnity insurance. 37 In
addition, the CCBE Code emphasizes that a lawyer must obtain instruc-
tions from a party before undertaking representation, although it does
not specify the requirements for obtaining such authorization from
groups in remote locations. 3'
The appropriate parameters of the lawyer's relationship with victims
in international human rights litigation are particularly controversial.
Some scholars believe that the promulgation of constructive jurispru-
dence should preempt the interests of an aggrieved individual or group
and that "[h]uman rights norms or principles can even be the underlying
'client." "..39 Indeed, David Weissbrodt has argued that a lawyer should
forego the pursuit of particular claims if the client has "virtually no
chance" of prevailing and the resulting precedents may adversely affect
prospective litigants. '4 To illustrate his point, Weissbrodt denounced the
"doomed" challenge to legalized abortion in the United States filed with
the Inter-American Commission by the lawyers for the plaintiffs in Baby
Boy. 141 The communication, filed by Catholics for Christian Political
135. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL CODE OF ETHICS, pmbl (1988),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IntemationalEthics.pdf.
136. See John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics, in RIGHTS,
LIABILITY, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 207 (Mary C. Daly & Roger J.
Goebel eds., 1995).
137. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, arts.
3.12, 3.2, 3.8.1.1, 3.9 (1998), available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/code20O2_en.pdf.
138. Id. art. 3.1.1.
139. Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Hu-
man Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505, 533 (2003).
140. See David Weissbrodt, Ethical Problems of an International Human Rights Law
Practice, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 217, 247-48 (1985). The class of cases referenced
by Weissbrodt, including those which could create bad law, appears to be broader than the
frivolous cases prohibited by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11.
141. Baby Boy, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.54,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981). Weissbrodt also criticized the lawyers for the plaintiffs in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic for seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court of the decision of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the district court's decision that it
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Action, Lawyers for Life, and certain like-minded individuals, alleged
that the U.S. government had violated the right of an aborted fetus to life
by permitting the termination of a pregnancy in accordance with the U.S.142 143
Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. While
conceding that a refusal by the lawyers might have violated their obliga-
tions to represent their clients "with reasonable diligence,' 1"44 Weissbrodt
justified his ranking of priorities based on the relative paucity of interna-
tional human rights precedent (at least in 1985, when his article was
published) and the corresponding impact of each new decision on the
future development of the law. 14 He further maintained that withdrawal
would have been permissible to prevent "imprudent or repugnant" con-
duct. 146
lacked jurisdiction under the ATCA to adjudicate a claim for damages filed by Israeli survivors
of the victims of an attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. See Weissbrodt, supra
note 140, at 245-47. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002). "Reasonable diligence" is de-
fined as acting "with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf." Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. In the context of ATCA litigation in
U.S. courts, where lawyers are bound by applicable state codes of ethics, a lawyer's failure to
comply with this obligation could lead to disciplinary sanctions. Id. at Preamble T 19. Other
relevant obligations embodied in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and replicated in
most state ethical codes are the duties of loyalty and zealous representation. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt.
1 ("Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a
client."); id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must also act with ... zeal in advocacy upon the cli-
ent's behalf."). The common U.S. nationalities of the petitioners, lawyers, and the respondent
arguably provide a stronger rationale for applying the Model Rules in Baby Boy than in other
cases filed in the Inter-American Commission.
145. See Weissbrodt, supra note 140, at 244. Although most international human rights
institutions are not technically bound by precedent, the consistency of their decisions bolsters
their credibility. See id. at 244-45 (noting aspects of consistency in the published jurispru-
dence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Human
Rights Committee). Moreover, the increasing integration of national and international juris-
prudence makes articulations of international law by domestic courts even more influential.
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization. 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000); Diane
F. Orentlicher, Constructing a Common Law of Humanity: The Jurisprudence of National and
International War Crimes Trials, Human Rights Violations in Latin America and the Univer-
salization of Human Rights: Moral and Legal Concerns, An International Symposium, Haifa,
Jan. 14-16, 2002 (on file with author).
146. See Weissbrodt, supra note 140, at 250 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.16(b)(3)). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) ("[A] lawyer
... shall withdraw from the representation of a client if... the representation will result in a
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law"); cf MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (permitting a lawyer to withdraw when a "client in a non-
adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the ... advice of the
lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules"); cf id. DR 2-110(c)(l)(e) (permitting with-
drawal where a client insists, "in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage
in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under
Disciplinary Rules").
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Weissbrodt's reasoning is questionable. A scenario where a plain-
tiff's lawyer could know with absolute certainty that her client has
"virtually no chance" of success is hard to imagine. In cases where a
client decides to undertake litigation in order to get a "day in court'' 147 or
advance a broader political strategy intended to raise public conscious-148
ness, success may be relative-although clearly frivolous litigation in
U.S. courts would be barred by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 49 Even a loss in litigation could achieve these ends,"O and a
lawyer would, under these circumstances, thwart her client's goals by
failing to pursue the case.
151
Given the level of disagreement among international lawyers about
the role of victims in international human rights litigation, the negotia-
tion of a code of professional conduct embodying applicable fiduciary
obligations would be difficult. The absence of any global association of
international human rights lawyers, which could coordinate the negotia-
tions and monitor the enforcement of any standards ultimately
promulgated, further complicates this project. 2 Moreover, the prospect
of self-regulation poses its own problems."5
One possible alternative would be for each regional human rights
system to promulgate its own ethical code, which would bind attorneys
appearing before it. The administration of a forum-specific bar exam
147. The opportunity to present in-court testimony may improve the plaintiff's chances
of receiving a favorable judgment. See Linda Drucker, Governmental Liability for "Disap-
pearances": A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 289, 297 (1988) (noting that the "decision [of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights] to hear the impassioned, heart-rending testimony of live witnesses ... gave the plain-
tiffs a decided advantage in presenting their case").
148. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1481 (1985) (expressing the hope that the World Court could fulfill its
role as "teacher to the citizenry" and assume the "extended resonance" of Brown v. Board of
Education).
149. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
150. See generally Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1331 (1995); Howard Tolley, Jr., Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human
Rights: Confronting Judicial Restraint, in WORLD JUSTICE: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 123, 141-42 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991).
151. A crucial problem in Baby Boy was the lack of any relationship between the peti-
tioning organizations and the party whose interests they purported to represent. The petitioners
easily satisfied the Inter-American Commission's liberal standing requirements by naming the
victim, an aborted fetus, and then used this forum as a platform to advance their own political
agenda. As in the Ecuador case discussed in Part 1H, the representatives of the petitioning or-
ganization had unfettered authority over the litigation.
152. Groups that might be willing to spearhead such a project include the Human Rights
Interest Group of the American Society of International Law, the American Bar Association's
International Law Section, and the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute.
153. See Thomas D. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 947, 957, 974 (2002) (arguing that lawyers today are "not guardians of the law"
and as mere citizens do not automatically maintain the highest possible ethical standards).
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could confirm attorneys' mastery of applicable ethical norms; discipli-
nary sanctions could be imposed in cases of noncompliance following
admission to practice.5 4 Given the increasing popularity of regional hu-
man rights fora, however, the implementation of these recommendations
is likely to require additional staff and resources.
B. Norms on NGO Accountability
In the absence of any consensus regarding the scope of lawyers' ob-
ligations to ensure that petitioning NGOs effectively represent victim
groups in litigation before regional human rights commissions, alterna-
tive methods of promoting NGO accountability are necessary. While
domestic legislation governs recognition of these entities in many coun-
tries, their activities remain largely unregulated at the international
level. "'55
Some constraints on NGO participation in the international arena do
exist. In order to obtain consultative status with the United Nations,"' for
example, NGOs must be "of representative character ' and fulfill cer-
tain organizational criteria, including having an established headquarters,
an executive organ and office, a democratically adopted constitution
providing for policy determinations by a representative body, authority
to speak for their members, and financial independence from govern-/ . 158
mental bodies. As Kerstin Martens has noted, however, these standards
are sufficiently open-ended that certain human rights-violating govern-
ments have succeeded in manipulating them to obtain consultative status
for their own NGOs, known as GONGOs (government-organized
NGOs), which can then advocate on their behalf at the United Nations.'5 9
Over the last several decades, international lawyers and social scien-
tists have tried repeatedly to develop international standards governing
the juridical personality of NGOs, but governments have generally re-
154. I am indebted to Dinah Shelton for these ideas.
155. Martens, supra note 102, at 2.
156. See U.N. CHARTER art. 71 (providing that the United Nations Economic and Social
Council "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organiza-
tions which are concerned with matters within its competence").
157. Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations, E.S.C. Res.
1296, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968) (requiring
NGOs to "represent a substantial portion, and express the views of major sections of the popu-
lation or of the organized persons within the particular field of its competence").
158. Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations And Non-Governmental
Organizations, E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. ESCOR, 31st Sess., 49th plenary mtg., 9-11, 13,
44, U.N. Doc. E/I 996/31 (1996). These criteria are similar to the requirements for NGO regis-
tration with the Union of International Associations in Brussels, which is limited to
international NGOs, and NGO participation in the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe. See Martens, supra note 102, at 16 & n.63 (citing http://www.uia.org), 18 & n.74.
159. Martens, supra note 102, at 8-9.
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jected their efforts. "° To date, the only international agreement on NGOs
that has entered into force is the European Convention on the Recogni-
tion of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental
Organisations."' This agreement requires states parties to recognize na-
tional NGOs accorded legal status pursuant to the laws of other states
parties, as well as international NGOs with a "non-profit-making aim of
international utility" that operate in at least two European countries."'
This instrument has no bearing, however, on NGOs' ability to file com-
munications with regional human rights commissions.
The increasing prominence of human rights NGOs in the interna-
tional arena has heralded new calls for formal regulation to bolster their
legitimacy."' By contrast with earlier initiatives, which have focused on
government legislation, Robert Blitt advocates the adoption of standards
that could be independently developed, implemented, monitored, and
enforced by human rights NGOs themselves.1 64 He proposes that such
standards should be advanced by a representative consortium of leading
human rights organizations working with academics and judges who
have expertise in international law. I Such standards would encompass a
broad spectrum of issues, including mandate definition, professional
staff and board membership criteria, financing and financial disclosure
requirements, best practices for operations, and best practices for col-
laboration with other human rights organizations. 166 Blitt envisions
supplemental guidelines for particular types of NGO work, including
160. Id. at 19-20 & nn.78-83 (summarizing initiatives undertaken by the Union of In-
ternational Associations and the Institut de Droit International).
161. The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organisations, Apr. 24, 1986, Europ. T.S. No. 124, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enfTreatiesfWord/124.doc.
162. See id. art. 1.
163. See, e.g., Martens, supra note 102, at 23-24; Slim, supra note 25, 45-49.
164. See Blitt, supra note 36, at 391-93. Numerous humanitarian organizations have
already undertaken similar initiatives. See Slim, supra note 25, 11 (noting that numerous
humanitarian and development NGOs, including World Vision International, Oxfam Interna-
tional, and Caritas International, are pursuing a "quality and standards approach"). For
instance, 307 humanitarian NGOs have signed a Code of Conduct authored by the Interna-
tional Red Cross. See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The
Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in
Disaster Relief, available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp (requiring signa-
tories to be independent of government and religion and to pledge accountability to "those we
seek to assist"); see also Humanitarian Accountability Project, at http:l/
www.hapintemational.org (representing the combined effort of 50 humanitarian organizations,
which established an ombudsman to monitor NGO accountability); The Sphere Project, Hu-
manitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, at http://
www.sphereproject.org.
165. Blitt, supra note 36, at 392.
166. Id. at 393.
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litigation, 6 1 which could incorporate the fiduciary obligations discussed
in Part IV
While innovative, Blitt's proposed strategy has many of the same
practical limitations as an international code of professional responsibil-
ity. The selection of a "representative" consortium of "leading" human
rights organizations is likely to be quite controversial, and NGOs which
do not feel sufficiently engaged in the process of developing the stan-
dards may opt out completely. Moreover, as Blitt himself acknowledges,
enforcement of international standards is a perennial problem.1
6
1
Some of these obstacles could be addressed if the norms were prom-
ulgated by a body of independent experts under the auspices of the
United Nations and had legally binding force. The Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (Corporate Norms), offer a
useful precedent. The UN Working Group on the Working Methods and
Activities of Transnational Corporations developed these norms with
input from governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, un-
ions, multinational corporations, and other business enterprises. 70 A
comparable UN Working Group could be established to develop norms
on NGO accountability, with input from international and local human
rights NGOs, victims, governments, and other relevant actors. However,
167. Id.
168. Id. at 394 (noting that non-binding best practices "lack teeth," while an independent
monitoring body might lack legitimacy and authority within the NGO community); see also
Slim, supra note 25, 11 (noting the "tendency of standards to proliferate and further bureauc-
ratise organisations with an overly procedural mind-set").
169. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 55th Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Corporate
Norms]. While emphasizing that the Norms did not have legal standing, the UN Commission
on Human Rights confirmed their "importance and priority" in April 2004 and asked the Of-
fice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct further research and report
on "options for strengthening standards ... and possible means for their implementation"
before the Commission's next session. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the
Sixtieth Session of the Commmission, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 60th Sess., Agenda
Item 21(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.1l/Add.7 (2004); Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Comm'n
on Human Rights, In (a), (b), Decision 2004/116, U.N. Doc. E/CNY/2004/L. l l/Add.7 (2004).
At its 2005 session, the Commission adopted a resolution welcoming the report and called for
the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Rapporteur on human rights, transnational
corporations, and other business entities. E-mail from David Weissbrodt, Professor, University
of Minnesota Law School (May 13, 2005) (on file with author). Professor John Ruggie of
Harvard University's Center for Business and Government has since been chosen to fill this
position. E-mail from David Weissbrodt (Sept. 26, 2005) (on file with author).
170. Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/13 (2003).
1134 [Vol. 26:1097
From Dyad to Triad
the process used to formulate the Corporate Norms is not directly trans-
ferable to the realm of NGO accountability due to the different
stakeholders involved and the heightened interest of governments, whose
conduct is often the focus of human rights NGO activities.
With respect to enforcement, the Corporate Norms are ultimately in-
tended to impose binding human rights obligations on private business
entities. The Norms anticipate that the United Nations and "other inter-
national and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be
created" will monitor companies' compliance, with input from NGOs
and other relevant stakeholders. 7' In cases where monitoring reveals that
a company's failure to comply with the Corporate Norms has resulted in
harm to an individual, entity, or community, the company may be re-
quired to pay reparations.' However, the lack of any consensus in the
international community on the authoritativeness of the Corporate
Norms or the viability of implementing the proposed enforcement
scheme may make their use as a model premature.
C. Amendment of Standing Requirements
Given the substantial hurdles to promulgation of a code of profes-
sional conduct for human rights lawyers and adoption of legally binding
norms for human rights NGOs, the most expedient option for imple-
menting the lawyer-NGO-victim triad would appear to be amendment of
the existing standing requirements in the Inter-American and African
Commissions. At a minimum, petitioning NGOs and their lawyers
should be required to prove that they have obtained the free, prior, and
informed consent of the relevant victims (or their next of kin) or justify
their failure to do so,' 7 demonstrate the bona fides of the fact-finding
methodology they have employed to prepare the petition, and disclose
their funding sources. 74 These additional requirements would help to
ensure that petitioning NGOs adequately and effectively represent the
people whose interests are at the heart of regional human rights litigation
and that the work of regional human rights commissions resonates with
these individuals and, where appropriate, their communities. Obviously,
the requirements would also give governments additional grounds on
which to challenge the admissibility of a petition.
171. Corporate Norms, supra note 169, art. 16.
172. Id. art. 18.
173. For example, advocates' failure to obtain free, prior, and informed consent could be
justified with respect to victims who are very young or severely mentally disabled.
174. Ideally, petitioning NGOs would also be required to present a plan for engaging in
ongoing communications throughout the litigation process. Revealing such information to the
target government, however, could threaten the confidentiality of future communications.
Thanks to Viviana Krsticevic for highlighting this risk.
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If implemented, these supplemental requirements would impose an
added administrative burden on the commissions. This burden could be
reduced through the use of pre certification requirements, which have
been employed in Europe. In Germany, for example, both the Standard
Contract Terms Act and the Unfair Competition Act'75 grant a right of
action to consumer associations that have been screened by the Federal• " z. 176
Administrative Office. Similarly, a proposed Directive of the European
Parliament and Council on access to justice in environmental matters
would confer automatic standing on certain independent non-profit envi-
ronmental organizations characterized as "qualified entities" under either
an advance recognition procedure or on a case-by-case basis.
77
Amended standing requirements would have the added advantage of
according the gate-keeping function to a third party, namely the forum
itself, which makes effective enforcement more likely than in contexts
where self-regulation is the norm. The only potential drawback, other
than the long negotiation process that any changes to the procedural
rules of a regional forum will inevitably require, is that the requirements
could be applied so rigidly that they deprive deserving victims of an op-
portunity to be heard.'78
VI. CONCLUSION
The liberal standing requirements that apply in the Inter-American
and African Commissions have the potential to marginalize the people
whose rights these fora were established to protect. This Article attempts
to avert this scenario by delineating fiduciary obligations intended to
175. These laws were promulgated in furtherance of Germany's obligations under the
European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, which assigned
rights of action to "qualified entities," including consumer associations and independent pub-
lic bodies. See Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations
andAlternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 401, 418-19 (2002).
176. See Harold Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 355, 356 (2001).
177. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, COM(03)624 final, arts. 5, 8, 9. In
order to be recognized as a "qualified entity," an organization must have a structure which
enables it to ensure the adequate pursuit of its statutory objectives, must have been legally
constituted and worked actively for environmental protection for a specified period not ex-
ceeding three years, and must have its annual statement of accounts certified for a specified
period. See id. art. 8.
178. Indeed, the narrow interpretation of Article III by some U.S. courts has arguably
had this effect. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 490 (1975) (denying taxpayers standing to chal-
lenge zoning regulations, which allegedly increased the need for subsidized housing through
imposition of higher taxes); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 727 (1972) (denying a group standing to
challenge a licensing agreement because it was not personally injured). I appreciate this in-
sight from Paul Hoffman.
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foster a deeper connection between advocates, whether lawyers or NGOs
or both, and the victims of human rights abuses whom they purport to
represent. The proposed lawyer-NGO-victim triad is intended to grant
victims maximum autonomy over litigation in regional human rights
commissions while bolstering the legitimacy and effectiveness of these
fora. If successfully implemented, this arrangement could foster greater
empowerment of victims, heighten the impact of regional human rights
litigation, and begin to resolve controversial ethical dilemmas in the in-
ternational arena.

